# ATTACK_SURFACE — The attack surface is larger than the prompt.

> Agentic systems select tools, assume identities, retrieve data, call services, change state, and create external effects. INTRUSIVE.AI tests the paths between adversarial influence and those effects using observable synthetic environments.

- Status: available testing approach; target-specific coverage depends on declared capabilities.
- Document version: 1.0
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-06
- Intended audience: security testers, application architects, and agent builders.
- Related products: Interceptor Sandbox, Operator Sandbox, Attack Harness, ITI.
- Canonical URLs: [website section](https://intrusive.ai/#attack_surface), [this document](https://intrusive.ai/content/attack-surface.md).

## Problem addressed

The paths worth testing are often the paths least safe to exercise against production. INTRUSIVE.AI replaces declared surrounding services and data with observable, restorable simulations so testers can investigate consequences in a controlled environment. Provider calls and explicitly configured external targets remain separate outbound paths.

## How it works

The website's effect chain is:

1. **Adversarial input:** a prompt, document, tool result, or event introduces attacker influence.
2. **Model:** the model interprets input in its current context.
3. **Plan:** the application adopts a goal or chooses subsequent actions.
4. **Tool call:** it attempts to use an application capability.
5. **State change:** a service, file, grant, or other state changes.
6. **External effect:** data disclosure, unauthorized access, resource consumption, or another consequence follows. In Interceptor, declared effects occur against synthetic destinations.

The chain is a testing model, not a claim that private model reasoning is observable. Investigators join recorded inputs, invocations, state changes, and target observations, while labeling inferred intent separately.

## External methodology

OWASP's [Agentic Top 10](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/) supplies risk categories. [MITRE ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/) supplies adversary techniques. The following is INTRUSIVE.AI's interpretive mapping, not an official crosswalk or certification:

| Effect-chain stage | Relevant OWASP categories |
| --- | --- |
| Input and model context | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning |
| Plan and capability selection | ASI02 Tool Misuse & Exploitation; ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain |
| Access and tool execution | ASI03 Identity & Privilege Abuse; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution |
| Coordination and consequences | ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Comms; ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI10 Rogue Agents |

ATLAS [indirect prompt injection](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051.001) provides a specific example: retrieved content can carry instructions across a data-to-instruction boundary. A technique mapping establishes relevance; it does not prove that a product implements every technique or that an attempted attack succeeded.

## Practitioner benefits and technical properties

Test the application capability behind a model response, rather than scoring only the response wording. Interceptor provides declared simulated HTTP/MCP services, closed DNS, files, local tools, synthetic identities, and attacker sinks. Operator constrains experiment access and feedback. Attack Harness refines experiments within those constraints. ITI selects scenarios based on target capabilities and threat context.

Define what the target can observe, what the tester can change, which authority should remain intact, and what evidence would demonstrate an effect. Compare a baseline and an attack variant from equivalent declared state.

## Evidence

- [Environment Blueprint](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/environment-blueprint.md): declared services, data, state and application configuration.
- [Injection and evaluation guide](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/injections-and-evaluation.md): injection surfaces and configured behavior checks.
- [Operator HTTPS targets](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/docs/HTTPS_TARGETS.md): fixed destinations, policy and externally observable assurance.
- [OWASP prompt-injection guidance](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/): recommends adversarial testing of trust boundaries and access controls.
- [Reported agent vulnerabilities and incidents](https://intrusive.ai/content/mission.md): dated examples linking retrieved-content attacks, configuration tampering, unintended egress and real third-party effects to testing hypotheses.

## Limitations and non-goals

Coverage depends on environment fidelity and observable boundaries. A simulated protocol is not the complete behavior of every production service. Undeclared process activity or hidden application state may remain unobserved. This approach does not replace application threat modeling, secure engineering, or production access controls.

## Terminology and related content

An **attack surface** is an interface or state through which influence can reach the system. An **effect** is an observed consequence; an attempted effect is not automatically a demonstrated effect. See [scenarios](https://intrusive.ai/content/scenarios.md) for concrete testing hypotheses and [sandbox mechanics](https://intrusive.ai/content/mechanics.md) for execution and observation boundaries.
