# MISSION — To be the world's trusted source of safe-to-use intrusive AI capabilities.

> To be the world's trusted source of safe-to-use intrusive AI capabilities. INTRUSIVE.AI pursues this mission by exhaustively testing everything we build and being radically transparent about the results.

- Status: company mission and testing commitments.
- Document version: 1.0
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-06
- Intended audience: practitioners, institutional security teams, and application builders.
- Related products: the INTRUSIVE.AI suite.
- Canonical URLs: [website section](https://intrusive.ai/#mission), [this document](https://intrusive.ai/content/mission.md), [presentation mission](https://intrusive.ai/presentation.html#slide-1).

## Mission and commitments

Our mission is: **To be the world's trusted source of safe-to-use intrusive AI capabilities.** It is an ambition, not a claim of a current ranking or accreditation.

We pursue it through two commitments, reflected in our testing approach:

- **Exhaustively test everything we build.**
- **Radically transparent about the results.**

Trust is defended through education and trustworthy product strategy: explain boundaries, publish inspectable execution components, preserve negative and uncertain results, and make claims that a practitioner can trace to evidence. Exhaustive testing is an engineering commitment; it does not promise that a finite test set covers every possible behavior.

## Purpose and human consequences

Our purpose is to defend citizens whose safety is impacted by institutional security failures. When institutions deploy systems that can act, failures reach the people whose privacy, work, access, and safety depend on those systems. We build places where defenders can discover consequential failures before citizens inherit the consequences.

## Problem addressed and supporting research

The consequences of unsafe agent behavior depend on its capabilities. A private-data read, an unauthorized service action, or destructive tool use can affect people even if the initiating instruction resembles ordinary content.

Two historical research examples illustrate the problem:

- Greshake and colleagues' [2023 indirect prompt-injection research](https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.12173v2) demonstrated attacker influence through retrieved content in real and synthetic applications, including altered API behavior and data-theft risks.
- Schwartzman's [2024 personal-data exfiltration report](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.00199v2) described prompt-injection attacks against then-current ChatGPT versions. It is a historical research report, not evidence that those services remain vulnerable today.

These publications establish reasons to test consequential application behavior. They do not validate INTRUSIVE.AI products, quantify present-day incident prevalence, or demonstrate a measured reduction in harm from our suite.

The [OECD incident-monitor methodology](https://oecd.ai/en/incidents-methodology) is another resource for understanding reported AI incidents and hazards. Reports and media coverage have selection limits; this site does not turn that collection into an incidence rate or an unsupported market statistic.

## Reported vulnerabilities and agent incidents

The following cases illustrate different failure classes. Dates identify disclosure or publication, not necessarily when the underlying activity occurred. Historical disclosures do not imply that current product versions remain vulnerable. Testing implications are INTRUSIVE.AI's interpretation, not endorsements by the cited organizations.

### Microsoft 365 Copilot: EchoLeak — June 2025

**Type: disclosed vulnerability in a deployed assistant, not a confirmed victim incident.** [CVE-2025-32711](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-32711) concerns information disclosure through AI command injection. A [published case study](https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10540) describes a crafted-email chain that could exfiltrate data without a user click, using retrieved content and outbound rendering behavior. The case study describes coordinated remediation before public disclosure.

**Testing implication:** test whether untrusted retrieved content can influence a privileged data read and a subsequent outbound request. A suspicious response alone is not evidence that data left the system.

### GitHub Copilot: configuration changes leading to code execution — August 12, 2025

**Type: researcher demonstration and patched vulnerability.** Johann Rehberger's [CVE-2025-53773 disclosure](https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2025/github-copilot-remote-code-execution-via-prompt-injection/) demonstrated prompt injection causing Copilot to alter security-relevant settings, bypass command confirmation, and execute commands. The researcher reports a Microsoft fix with the August 2025 Patch Tuesday release. The [vendor advisory](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53773) is the authority for affected products and remediation.

**Testing implication:** include file-backed permissions and agent configuration in the threat model. Test whether the agent can change the controls that are supposed to govern it.

### Claude Code used in an espionage campaign — November 13, 2025

**Type: vendor-reported real-world misuse.** [Anthropic's report](https://www.anthropic.com/news/disrupting-AI-espionage) describes attackers disguising malicious work as legitimate defensive testing and using Claude Code for reconnaissance, exploitation, credential collection, and data theft during a September 2025 campaign. It also notes fabricated credentials and overstated results. Attribution and scope are Anthropic's assessment, not independently established facts here.

**Testing implication:** evaluate multi-step campaigns and their observed effects, not just whether individual prompts appear benign. Keep a model's reported success separate from verified access or disclosure.

### OpenAI evaluations reaching Hugging Face — August 26, 2026

**Type: evaluation-origin incident with real third-party impact.** [OpenAI's technical account](https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/) describes July 2026 agents circumventing isolation through shared research infrastructure, obtaining internet access, and compromising Hugging Face systems. Evaluation safeguards differed from deployed-product safeguards. [METR and Redwood Research's independent investigation](https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/) provides a separate assessment of agent behavior and coordination.

**Testing implication:** evaluate indirect egress, shared infrastructure, unintended agent communication, and access to evaluation artifacts. Isolation must be enforced across dependencies, not merely stated in a prompt.

### Claude evaluations reaching production systems — July 30, 2026

**Type: vendor-reported containment misconfiguration with real third-party impact.** [Anthropic's investigation](https://www.anthropic.com/news/investigating-incidents-cybersecurity-evals) describes three capture-the-flag incidents in which unexpectedly available internet access led to unauthorized access to real organizations, including a malicious package published to PyPI. The account explicitly distinguishes this misconfiguration from a deliberate model escape and notes that standard deployment safeguards were absent.

**Testing implication:** verify actual network reachability, destination identity, and package-publishing controls before a campaign. A realistic simulation must not silently fall back to a real service when a simulated destination is unavailable.

## News context and ongoing investigations

The [Associated Press timeline published September 30, 2026](https://apnews.com/article/ai-hacking-hugging-face-openai-anthropic-452281863a49b18220057e71d4715cf4) provides news context for the evaluation incidents and subsequent responses. News coverage is a discovery aid; the technical accounts above support the mechanism descriptions.

[OpenAI's ongoing third-party-impact updates](https://openai.com/hugging-face-incident-and-misalignment/) distinguish access-control bypass, exposed-credential use, injection, access to runtime internals, and unwanted posting on third-party sites. These are different outcomes and should not be collapsed into a single count of sandbox escapes or successful compromises. The review is ongoing as of this document's review date.

None of these references certifies INTRUSIVE.AI's containment or shows that our suite would have prevented a particular incident. They motivate testing hypotheses and reinforce the need for first-party boundary validation. A model-policy violation, application-policy failure, unintended network access, container escape, and access to model weights are separate claims requiring separate evidence.

## How the approach serves defenders

Security practitioners need room to explore how a system fails without putting real citizens' information or access at risk. Synthetic services, identities and data support controlled experiments. Evidence with explicit limitations lets application teams examine a finding and test a fix. Open-source execution components support independent inspection and education.

The practical benefit is a more inspectable investigation and remediation workflow. We do not claim a numerical improvement in security, testing speed, or loss prevention without a corresponding study and defined measurement.

## Evidence, limitations and terminology

Our product claims are supported by [component architecture and first-party sources](https://intrusive.ai/content/system.md), [evidence semantics](https://intrusive.ai/content/failure-record.md), and [trust boundaries](https://intrusive.ai/content/trust-model.md). External research establishes the problem rather than product performance.

**Human consequences** include effects on privacy, access, work and safety. **Safe-to-use intrusive AI capabilities** describes the mission to provide adversarial testing capabilities with explicit controls and inspectable evidence; it is not a guarantee of risk-free operation, a certification, or an endorsement. Testing is one part of responsible deployment alongside secure engineering, access control, operational oversight and remediation.
