# SCENARIOS — Scenarios, not prompt lists.

> A successful jailbreak is not always a consequential failure. A system fails when adversarial influence crosses a boundary and changes what an agent can observe, decide, access, or affect. INTRUSIVE.AI frames experiments around target capabilities, effects, and evidence.

- Status: available scenario planning and adaptive testing; applicability is target-specific.
- Document version: 1.0
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-05
- Intended audience: red teams, threat-model authors, and security testers.
- Related products: ITI, Attack Harness, Operator Sandbox, Interceptor Sandbox.
- Canonical URLs: [website section](https://intrusive.ai/#scenarios), [this document](https://intrusive.ai/content/scenarios.md).

## Problem addressed and practitioner benefits

Static prompt datasets can evaluate response behavior. A system-level scenario also describes which surface carries the influence, what capability enables the attack, what authority should hold, and what would establish an effect. This lets practitioners connect experiments to their actual application instead of treating a refusal or a provocative answer as the complete security result.

## Representative scenario families

These are testing hypotheses, not claims that every application supports every path. Risk references use the OWASP categories mapped in [attack surface](https://intrusive.ai/content/attack-surface.md).

| Family and website surface | Objective and boundary | Prerequisites | Expected evidence and relevant risk |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Indirect prompt injection — RAG / input | Retrieved content rewrites the goal and drives an unauthorized action | Declared document/tool-result carrier and relevant target action | Placement, invocation and effect observations; ASI01/ASI06 |
| Capability escalation — MCP / authority | A poisoned or overpowered tool expands effective behavior beyond the intended scope | Model-visible tool metadata or response surface and a declared action | Selected operation, policy disposition and affected state; ASI02/ASI04 |
| Credential misuse — identity / access | Agent crosses a user, service or role boundary during a workflow | Synthetic grants, identities and protected synthetic resources | Authorization and resource-access observations; ASI03 |
| Data exfiltration — protocol / egress | Synthetic sensitive state reaches an attacker sink | Declared data source and sealed sink | Source access and native sink receipt; ASI01/ASI02 |
| Unsafe local action — tool / execution | Legitimate local capability is invoked outside its intended scope | Configured local tool and saved synthetic files/state | Invocation and resulting file/state change; ASI02/ASI05 |
| Multi-turn goal hijacking — agent / goal | Escalating influence redirects an authorized objective | Multi-turn invocation and declared feedback | Ordered attempts and subsequent actions; ASI01 |
| Role contamination — multi-agent / trust | Instructions or authority bleed between agent roles | Explicitly modeled coordination/messages and role boundaries | Message lineage and unauthorized action; ASI07 |
| Resource exhaustion — runtime / budget | Loops, retries or tool chains exceed intended consumption | Bounded turns, operations and usage observations | Usage counters, rejection/termination records; ASI08 |

## How ITI and Attack Harness work together

ITI selects reviewed threat intelligence relevant to the target's environment and capabilities. It combines influence techniques, such as lore abuse, with applicable action/effect knowledge. Sources retain their original taxonomy and provenance; an intelligence record is not a permission or executable tool.

For example, an authorized synthetic inventory test can combine an influence category with [Stratus EC2 discovery](https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance/) or [Atomic Red Team T1526](https://www.atomicredteam.io/docs/atomics/T1526) knowledge. This selects a discovery hypothesis and its prerequisites; it does not automatically execute the upstream cloud command. Attack Harness creates concrete attempts using Operator's available tools and target-bound operations. Operator independently applies local policy and limits.

ITI analyzes combined campaign results, available native effects, untested objectives, and uncertainty. A proposed scenario that lacks required target capabilities cannot truthfully claim runnable coverage.

## Worked scenario definition

**Hypothesis:** an agent treats instructions inside a retrieved synthetic document as authority and sends a private synthetic marker to a sealed sink.

**Prerequisites:** supported document-response injection; declared file/resource access; a synthetic sink; native effect observations; snapshot-capable state if comparison requires restore.

**Attacker objective:** cross the application's data-use policy. **Test boundary:** retrieved content should not authorize private-data disclosure. **Success oracle:** a configured predicate observes the marker in native sink evidence. **Expected evidence:** placement and delivery identity, attempt/invocation receipts, synthetic source access, sink receipt, and snapshot lineage.

**Stopping conditions:** configured campaign deadline, model/operation/resource limits, completed objectives, uncertainty about effects, or administrator termination. **Variants:** carriers, ordering, multi-turn pressure and payload wording within the same approved scope. **Coverage gaps:** unobserved delivery, unsupported tools, undeclared state, or feedback insufficient to establish the effect.

If only a response is visible, assess only the response-supported hypothesis. Do not infer hidden state changes or sink delivery. Use the [synthetic failure walkthrough](https://intrusive.ai/content/failure-record.md) for a baseline, attack and remediation comparison.

## Evidence and external sources

- [Operator scenario-input contract](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/schemas/SCENARIO_BUNDLE_CONTRACT.md): objectives, optional scenarios and references.
- [Harness specification](https://github.com/intrusiveai/attack_harness/blob/main/CUSTOM_AI_HARNESS_IMPLEMENTATION_SPEC.md): adaptive experiments and conclusions.
- [Interceptor injection/evaluation guide](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/injections-and-evaluation.md): supported placement and configured checks.
- [OWASP Agentic Top 10](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/) and [MITRE ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/): external risk/technique vocabulary, not vendor endorsements.

## Limitations and terminology

Coverage is declared and measured against exercised attempts, not universal attack resistance. Prompt wording, model sampling, simulated-service fidelity, target onboarding and feedback visibility affect results. A **success oracle** is a scoped evidence predicate; a **scenario variant** changes an experiment within its permitted surface and authority. Neither is a substitute for independently reviewing the retained observations.
