# TRUST_MODEL — Trust begins with explicit controls.

> Trustworthy testing begins with properties a practitioner can inspect: explicit scope, granted authority, restorable declared state, inspectable evidence, and visible limitations. INTRUSIVE.AI combines technical boundaries with transparent explanation of what those boundaries establish.

- Status: available controls; deployment-specific configuration remains the administrator's responsibility.
- Document version: 1.0
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-05
- Intended audience: security architects, administrators, and evidence reviewers.
- Related products: all four suite components.
- Canonical URLs: [website section](https://intrusive.ai/#trust_model), [this document](https://intrusive.ai/content/trust-model.md).

## Operational properties

**Scope is explicit.** Every test starts with defined targets, capabilities, and stopping conditions. Host configuration controls real destinations, credentials, permitted operations, feedback, and hard limits. A scenario or model response cannot grant itself a new destination or operation.

**Authority is granted.** Test systems receive access through declared boundaries. Operator mediates the harness's model and target calls. Real provider credentials remain on the trusted host. Interceptor supplies synthetic identities and grants within the simulated environment; those identities do not become real production credentials.

**Declared state is restorable.** Eligible environments can be reconstructed from checkpoints and investigated in sequential branches. Restore starts a fresh target process and retains lineage. It does not freeze process memory, restore undeclared external systems, or guarantee identical later model decisions. Cumulative campaign limits survive target restore.

**Evidence is inspectable.** Findings retain observable links from input to effects where the integration provides them. Artifact identity, journal integrity, source session, revision, visibility, and assurance remain part of interpretation. Model-generated conclusions are separately identified claims.

**Limits stay visible.** Reports preserve untested objectives, missing evidence, assumptions, unknown effects, and cleanup outcomes. A completed report with gaps is not a clean security verdict.

## Authority and shared responsibility

| Actor or boundary | Responsibility |
| --- | --- |
| Administrator | Authorize testing, review images/blueprints, configure destinations, secrets, limits and retention |
| ITI | Select reviewed knowledge, plan capability-bound scenarios, assess results without broadening execution permissions |
| Operator trusted host | Admit campaigns, broker calls, enforce policy/budgets, manage lifecycle and evidence |
| Attack Harness guest | Propose experiments through the fixed catalog and interpret permitted feedback; no host-policy authority |
| Interceptor host/supervisor | Enforce the sealed target environment, simulate declared dependencies, record native observations and reconstruct eligible state |
| Target application | Potentially untrusted behavior inside the target container |
| Host kernel and Docker | Trusted isolation foundation, requiring administrator maintenance |
| Selected model provider | External recipient of submitted model requests under the provider's terms |

Operator treats a compromised harness as a boundary concern and validates requests on the host. Interceptor's supervisor, reviewed environment, host binary, Docker daemon, kernel and local administrative processes are trusted. Local loopback APIs are not an authenticated remote multi-tenant control plane. Run on an appropriately isolated development host or CI worker.

## Data flow, credentials and retention

The sandbox guests do not have general network access. The host makes explicitly configured provider calls. Model prompts and application content can therefore leave the host through that permitted path. ITI also uses its own configured planning model and intelligence connections. These are part of the deployment's data-flow review.

Provider credentials remain outside guest containers and are excluded from normal journals, checkpoints and exports. This does not redact secrets that a user incorrectly embeds in scenario text or application data. Use synthetic blueprint credentials and test records. Interceptor's native evidence can contain unredacted model/application content and should be protected accordingly.

Evidence is retained until administrator-controlled purge; stopping a campaign is not deletion. Purge removes managed retained data, not independently copied exports or all traces on underlying media. The administrator controls access, backup, encryption and retention of their installation. This document does not impose a fixed product-wide retention period or promise secure erasure.

The [website privacy policy](https://intrusive.ai/privacy_policy.txt) applies to website visits, not customer-hosted product execution. The site uses no cookies or analytics, records limited security access logs with a configured 30-day expiry, and loads Google Fonts. Its session-storage notice preference stays in the browser. The website's logging policy is not the products' evidence-retention policy.

## Evidence and claims ledger

| Property | Supporting first-party artifact |
| --- | --- |
| Fixed harness operations and host-enforced boundaries | [Operator specification](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/OPERATOR_SANDBOX_SPEC.md) and [harness contract](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/schemas/SHARED_CONTRACT.md) |
| Credential flow and target containment limits | [Interceptor security model](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/security.md) |
| Logical reconstruction and checkpoint prerequisites | [Snapshot guide](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/snapshots-and-restore.md) |
| Facts, claims, coverage and uncertainty remain distinct | [Reporting contract](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/docs/REPORTING.md) |
| Retention is administrator-controlled | [Operator purge](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/docs/PURGE.md) and [Interceptor file management](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/file-management.md) |

## Relationship to NIST AI RMF

The [NIST AI RMF 1.0 Core](https://airc.nist.gov/airmf-resources/airmf/5-sec-core/) names Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage. Our interpretive alignment is: configured authority supports governance; target context and capabilities support mapping; bounded experiments and evidence support measurement; remediation comparisons support management. This is methodology alignment, not certification, endorsement, or proof of compliance.

## Limitations, terminology and reporting

Containers share a kernel and are not VMs. Local administrative access, the Docker daemon and same-user processes remain inside the trust boundary. Internal integrity chains are not external attestation. External HTTPS targets can produce real effects and expose less evidence than native Interceptor targets. Neither a model conclusion nor a complete archive establishes exploit success by itself.

An **execution policy** grants actual access; **scenario guidance** suggests experiments. **Evidence visibility** determines who can inspect a record; **assurance** determines what it can support. Report security findings through the component [GitHub Issues links](https://intrusive.ai/content/open-source.md). See [failure records](https://intrusive.ai/content/failure-record.md) for a complete synthetic example.
