# USE_CASES — Security evaluation for agentic systems.

> INTRUSIVE.AI supports security evaluation of agentic systems through controlled attack simulation. These eight use cases describe practitioner workflows and the questions they help answer. Select a use case on the website to explore what to evaluate and the question it helps answer.

- Status: available suite capabilities; applicability depends on the target's declared environment, capabilities and evidence surfaces.
- Document version: 1.0
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-06
- Intended audience: security practitioners, red teams, agent developers and application owners.
- Related products: Operator Sandbox, Attack Harness, Interceptor Sandbox, Intrusive Threat Intelligence (ITI).
- Canonical URLs: [website section](https://intrusive.ai/#use_cases), [this document](https://intrusive.ai/content/use-cases.md).

Use cases describe why practitioners run an evaluation. [Scenarios](https://intrusive.ai/content/scenarios.md) describe the attack hypotheses, prerequisites and evidence used within that evaluation. All testing requires authorization and a declared scope.

## 01 / Agent capability escalation evaluation

Identify how agents attempt to exceed their permitted capabilities through tool abuse, unauthorized code or command execution, and manipulation of security-relevant configuration. Trace the attempted escalation and the controls it encounters—even when containment holds.

**Practitioner question:** How does the agent attempt to gain capabilities it was not granted?

## 02 / OWASP Agentic Top 10 evaluation

Evaluate agent behavior against the [OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/) using scenarios matched to the target’s environment and capabilities. Map observed behavior to relevant risk categories and make untested paths and evidence gaps explicit.

**Practitioner question:** Which agentic risks apply to this application, and what have we tested?

## 03 / Tool and MCP integration testing

Evaluate how new or changed tools affect an agent’s authority. Exercise poisoned responses, misleading tool metadata, overly broad permissions, and unintended downstream actions to identify where an integration changes what the agent can do.

**Practitioner question:** Does adding a tool introduce unintended authority?

## 04 / Security-control validation

Test guardrails, authorization checks, approval requirements, and output handling against adversarial behavior. Inspect attempted actions and recorded effects to determine which controls interrupt an attack path and which merely change the agent’s response.

**Practitioner question:** Do defenses prevent consequential actions, or merely produce reassuring responses?

## 05 / Agent and model security regression testing

Compare agent behavior before and after changes to models, prompts, tools, or application code. Run equivalent scenarios from comparable declared starting state and repeat trials where model variability matters to identify new failure paths.

**Practitioner question:** Did a model, prompt, tool, or application update weaken security?

## 06 / Incident reproduction and remediation testing

Reconstruct the relevant conditions of an observed failure using synthetic services and data. Preserve the path from input to effect, then compare the original and revised application to determine whether a fix closes that path.

**Practitioner question:** Can we reconstruct a failure and determine whether a fix closes the observed path?

## 07 / Operational resilience testing

Evaluate agent behavior when tools fail, dependencies become unavailable, or workflows encounter resource limits. Exercise retries and recovery paths to identify unsafe fallback actions, uncontrolled loops, and failures that propagate through the application.

**Practitioner question:** How does the agent behave when its tools, dependencies, or recovery paths fail?

## 08 / Threat-intelligence-informed red teaming

Translate relevant adversary techniques into campaigns matched to the target’s environment and capabilities. Combine influence techniques with applicable action-and-effect knowledge, then use observed feedback to refine attempts and assess consequential behavior.

**Practitioner question:** Can techniques used by relevant adversaries produce consequential failures in this agent?

## How the suite supports these evaluations

[Operator Sandbox](https://intrusive.ai/content/system.md) governs the offensive tester's permitted operations and limits. Attack Harness constructs attempts and adapts to permitted feedback. Interceptor Sandbox supplies declared synthetic target services, injection surfaces and native observations. ITI plans threat-intelligence-informed scenarios and analyzes combined campaign results; its applicability depends on the target's capabilities.

For capability escalation, distinguish the requested action, the control's disposition and the observed effect. A rejected command or a prevented tool invocation can still expose an escalation mechanism worth investigating. This workflow does not require a successful escape from the container or exploitation of the host kernel. The host and container runtime remain trusted infrastructure, not an automatically included breakout target.

For regression and remediation comparisons, record the target version, configuration, scenario and declared starting state. Restore supported logical state where available, and repeat trials when model variability matters. Do not interpret one matching response as deterministic replay or one unsuccessful attempt as proof of security. The [failure-record walkthrough](https://intrusive.ai/content/failure-record.md) illustrates the separation of attempt, observation and conclusion.

## Evidence and sources

- [Interceptor injection and evaluation guide](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/injections-and-evaluation.md): supported placement surfaces and configured evaluation checks.
- [Interceptor security guide](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/security.md): containment assumptions and trust boundaries.
- [Interceptor snapshots and restore](https://github.com/intrusiveai/interceptor_sandbox/blob/main/docs/snapshots-and-restore.md): declared state and restore prerequisites.
- [Operator reporting guide](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/docs/REPORTING.md): reports and retained campaign evidence.
- [Operator scenario-input contract](https://github.com/intrusiveai/operator_sandbox/blob/main/schemas/SCENARIO_BUNDLE_CONTRACT.md): target-relevant objectives, scenarios and references.
- [Scenario methodology](https://intrusive.ai/content/scenarios.md): intelligence mappings, stopping conditions and known coverage gaps.
- [OWASP Agentic Top 10](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/): external risk categories, not certification or an endorsement of the suite.

## Limitations and non-goals

These workflows do not imply universal target compatibility, exhaustive OWASP coverage, guaranteed incident reproduction or resistance to every attack. Coverage depends on configured capabilities, simulated-service fidelity, supported injection surfaces and available observations. Unsupported or untested paths must remain explicit gaps. Effects on undeclared Internet services are outside scope; use authorized synthetic services and data for consequential experiments.
